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The author's treatment of parties and of written constitutions is suggestive and illuminative. He shows deep reflection, rare insight and power of interpretation. He sees and reveals the problem with which parties have had to grapple, that of transmitting the will of the people to the government which the framers of the Constitution left to haphazard and voluntary associations. He shows that the problem of self-government in America is the problem of controlling our political parties, and he traces the forces by which the rising democratic spirit has from time to time modified party processes as a means of controlling the forces that control the government. The author brings refreshing vigor and enlightenment to his treatment of the necessity of parties; of the means by which the organs, or machinery, of the party have at times become more powerful than the party itself; the need of reward for honest party managers; of party influence on nationality; of the tendency of the popular election of senators to re-establish federalism; and of the need of bringing party organization under recognized law and more democratic control.

Professor McLaughlin is a careful student of political and constitutional history, to which he resorts as the most resourceful text for expounding political philosophy and constitutional law. His essay on the social compact shows what the framers of the Constitution thought on that subject, while his study of written constitutions shows the folly of supposing that great constitutions are ever "struck off by the brain and purpose of man" at a single time. These timely essays should not be neglected by students of politics and government. They hang well together and they may be studied profitably in a college course in political science.

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Les formes élémentaires de la vie religieuse. Le système totémique en Australie. By ÉMILE DURKHEIM. Paris: Felix Alcan, 1912. Pp. 649.

When, in 1896, M. Émile Durkheim and his associates began the publication of *L'Année sociologique*, they initiated a movement of far-reaching consequence in sociological circles. It was their primary purpose, in the words of M. Durkheim, "to react against the prevailing taste for generalities and facile system-making, to afford the public and particularly youthful workers attracted by sociology an idea of what the social reality in its richness and complexity truly is, in order to deflect them from the current ideology." The eleven volumes of the *Année*,

containing, besides original essays, extended analyses and reviews of all important books and articles in the fields of religion, law, ethics, economics, statistics, and demography, have well fulfilled this purpose. Too much credit can scarcely be given to the editors of the *Année* for the skill, patience, and critical spirit with which they have carried on what must have been a most laborious task. Recently, the scope of this publication has been somewhat changed: it is henceforth to consist entirely of reviews covering the sociological field and appearing in triennial volumes. Meanwhile, the work of the school is to be continued by means of a series of independent volumes issued irregularly as "Travaux de *L'Année sociologique*." Of these, the book under review forms the fourth and latest.¹

The monographs published in the *Année* and its supplements deal almost exclusively with subjects belonging to social anthropology. Durkheim writes on the prohibition of incest, totemism, the Australian matrimonial system, the definition of religious phenomena, and the elementary forms of religion. Hubert and Mauss collaborate in producing valuable studies of magic, sacrifice, and the collective representation of time. Bouglé treats of castes; Hertz, of the collective representation of death; and Lévy-Bruhl, of the mental life of primitive peoples. All this work is animated by certain general principles which are in sharp contrast with those either implicitly held or outwardly professed by the English social anthropologists (Tylor, Frazer, Jevons, Hartland, *et al.*), the only other group of systematic workers in this field. The French sociologists accuse their English neighbors of overemphasis on the resemblances between anthropological and sociological facts gathered from far and near; we must, it is urged, pay as much, or even more, attention to the real differences which may exist between facts superficially alike. This further implies that social facts shall be studied *in situ*, and not rudely wrenched from their original setting. Spencer's *Sociology* and Westermarck's *Moral Ideas* are held up as conspicuous examples of defective method in these respects. The French school, moreover, very properly emphasizes the need of studying social function as well as social structure; of showing how a particular custom or institution works under given circumstances. Perhaps their most original contribution to methodology is the theory of "collective representations," by them applied to a wide range of social phenomena. Such

¹ The others are: C. Bouglé, *Essais sur le régime des castes*, Paris, 1908; H. Hubert and M. Mauss, *Mélanges d'histoire des religions*, Paris, 1909; L. Lévy-Bruhl, *Les fonctions mentales dans les sociétés inférieures*, Paris, 1910.

a theory discards altogether the psychological or intellectualist account of origins: religion, for example, would by it be explained as the outcome of blind social forces which are utterly independent of individual ratiocination.

It is this principle of "collective representations" which underlies the elaborate, scholarly, and well-reasoned book before us. Australian totemism is here studied as the most elementary form of religion known to us; connected with it are ideas of *mana* (commonly defined as magico-religious energy, but, according to M. Durkheim, *mana totémique*), ideas of the soul, of spirits, and of gods (all totemic in origin, declares M. Durkheim), and the great mass of positive rites and negative rites or taboos. There is a wide variety of forms, but always one explanation: "The religious life is the most developed and abridged expression of the collective life in its entirety. If religion has engendered everything of importance in society, it remains none the less true that society is the soul of religion" (pp. 598-99).

It is obvious that our author is here giving us a sort of sociological *apologia* for the important place which religion has ever held in human affairs. He is not concerned with the truth or falsehood of our ideas—or the Australians'—about divinity; sociology has no verdict to pronounce on theological systems, high or low. Many, before M. Durkheim, have declared that religion is a social phenomenon and must be studied from the social standpoint. It has remained for him to raise such unsupported affirmations into a scientific generalization resting on much evidence carefully gathered, sifted, and analyzed. From this point of view his work may serve as a model study in social anthropology.

To the reviewer, this book, however, is more valuable for its sociological method of investigation than for its positive additions to our knowledge on specific points. The author surely exaggerates the significance of totemism as a primitive institution. At the very hour when Mr. J. G. Frazer in England is proclaiming throughout four bulky quartos that totemism, though important, is not the whole of savage society, and when Mr. Goldenweiser in America is making an "analytical study" of totemism to prove that it has no specific content at all, being merely a "process of socialization," comes M. Durkheim to assure us that everything significant in Australian religion is an outgrowth of totemic conceptions. In this way he would even explain the "high gods" (pp. 409-22) round whose misty personalities so much debate has raged. I am persuaded, too, that, in common with other members of his school, M. Durkheim makes far too much of the *mana* idea, not only in Australian, but in other

savage religions. More evidence than is yet available will have to be presented that the notion of *mana* is a truly primitive conception and not, as seems more likely, a relatively developed philosophical explanation, the investigation of which does not take us very far into the rudiments of the religious emotion. The time has gone by for "keys to all the mythologies." The elaborate systems which attempt to explain the totality of primitive religion by reference to a single factor—ancestor worship with Herbert Spencer, taboo with M. Reinach, totemism with M. Durkheim—"have their day and cease to be."

The volume is enriched with an ethnographic map of Australia. The proofreading, especially in the case of proper names, shows an accuracy unusual in a French book. It is a matter of real regret, however, that a work of such importance should be allowed to go forth without an index. For the latter, the detailed table of contents forms only a partial substitute.

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Race Improvement. By LAREINE HELEN BAKER. New York: Dodd, Mead & Co., 1912. Pp. 137. \$1.00.

Among the shoal of books which the recent interest in eugenics has called into existence, none deserves less favorable comment than the one now under review. The author has set out with the intention of writing "a little book on a great subject," yet for the most part the statements which she makes would lead the reader to suppose that she was covering the entire subject with perfect adequacy. Nor are her general statements justifiable. "Nurture, or environment, has its place, and an important one, in race improvement, but the overwhelming fact remains that more than three-fourths of the elements which build up a human soul are in its nature, not its nurture. The formative factor of greatest importance in the making of human life and character is heredity" (p. 14). Similar looseness of statement is displayed when she writes, "Degeneracy is not a disease by specific intention, it is an attribute to our social neglect, it is the result of our inattention to vital issues, it is a sign that we are no longer keenly anxious to elevate the race" (p. 32). It is not necessary to go further into the analysis in order to demonstrate the gross inadequacy of the author's treatment. The book is not well written; it represents no new viewpoint; it is neither scientific nor popular.

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